Professionalism in the Information and Communication Technology Industry

Professionalism is arguably more important in some occupations than in others. It is vital in some because of the life and death decisions that must be made, for example in medicine. In others the rapidly changing nature of the occupation makes efficient regulation difficult and so the professional behaviour of the practitioners is central to the good functioning of that occupation. The core idea behind this book is that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is changing so quickly that professional behaviour of its practitioners is vital because regulation will always lag behind

Online Communities in Saudi Arabia: an ethnographic study

This paper presents part of a research project about online communities in Saudi Arabia. The paper will address one of the research sub-questions, that is: What are the key features of participation in online communities in Saudi Arabia? The results presented in this paper are drawn from one of the techniques of data collection used in this research, that is, silent observation, which was conducted over a one-year period. In addition, the paper will discuss briefly the research design, including the research procedures. In its final section, some of the findings from this part of the project are presented

Human Enhancement and Communication: On Meaning and Shared Understanding

Our technologies have enabled us to change both the world and our perceptions of the world, as well as to change ourselves and to find new ways to fulfil the human desire for improvement and for having new capacities. The debate around using technology for human enhancement has already raised many ethical concerns, however little research has been done in how human enhancement can affect human communication. The purpose of this paper is to explore whether some human enhancements could change our shared lifeworld so radically that human communication as we know it would not be possible any longer. After exploring the kinds of communication problems we are concerned with as well as mentioning some possible enhancement interventions that could bring about such problems, we will address some of the ethical implications that follow from these potential communication problems. We argue that because of the role that communication plays in human society, this issue deserves attentio

IT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SHOULD THERE BE CONTROL?

Two views are prevalent with respect to suitable topics for scientific research. One, typically held by researchers, is that any topic of research is fair game for the researcher. The result of research is knowledge, and knowledge in itself is neither good nor bad, therefore there can be no moral reasons for restricting research in any area. The proviso of course is that the research is undertaken in an appropriate manner. The other view is that science, even pure science, should serve the needs of the broader society, and therefore the society should have a say in what scientific research is conducted. Some should be avoided or even forbidden because it is harmful or will most likely be put to some harmful uses, because it is useless and therefore a waste of public assets, or because other research is more important. This debate rests on a tangled web of theories, reasoning and assumptions. This paper will explore some of these underlying issues and examine the responsibilities of professional researchers, with particular reference to research in artificial intelligence

Conceptual schemes

In this thesis I develop an account of conceptual schemes as clusters of concepts. Such a notion would have little interest on its own, but it has interest because of the relationship such schemes have to the world, and to our experience of it. The view that the world and our experience of it depend in some on our conceptual scheme, is conceptual relativism. The basic argument developed here is that nontrivial content can be given to the notions of a conceptual scheme and conceptual relativism. However, this account has few of the radical implications sometimes thought to be inherent in conceptual relativism. In chapter I, I set the scene by giving a preliminary account of conceptual schemes, and isolating various possible conceptual schemist positions and conceptual relativist positions. In order to clarify the position for which I will argue, there is a brief consideration of Rescher's view of conceptual schemes, and also an initial look at several objections to the whole idea. Conceptual schemes are sometimes explained in terms of languages, and various problems with them in terms of translation. Chapter II examines the notion of language which might be relevant to such discussions. A theory of natural language is presented which forms the basis of some important later arguments. Various objections to conceptual schemes and relativism are examined in the next two chapters. Some arguments of Davidson and Rorty, that no sense can be attached to those notions, are the subject of chapter III, and chapter IV examines the frequently made claim that relativism refutes itself. It is argued in chapter V that the incommensurability of languages is relatively unimportant. This result is important for later discussions of the incommensurability of theories and schemes, and for. the significance of relativism. Chapter VI is the central chapter in the sense that in it the ideas of a conceptual scheme and of conceptual relativism are developed further on the basis of the previous arguments. It in turn provides the foundation for the following examinations of the theory-ladenness of observations and of natural kinds. A conceptual scheme, it is argued, affects how we observe the world. The argument of chapter VII is that observations are theoryladen. The account provided gives some teeth to the position developed in the previous chapter, and it takes into consideration many of the arguments and facts, or supposed facts, which are frequently thought to support the theory-ladenness thesis. Various consequences, or what are sometimes assumed to be consequences, of this thesis are also discussed. In chapter VIII I begin consideration of an argument which seems to show that the theory of conceptual schemes and relativism being developed cannot be right. This is the new essentialism, and the version examined is Putnam's. It is argued in chapter IX that a number of common objections to Putnam's theory do not prove it wrong, but some problems are revealed. A different argument against Putnam is given in chapter X, and as a result of this, his theory is modified, keeping what seem to me to be strengths, but making it compatible with the conceptual relativism of this thesis. On the basis of this, an account of essentialism and kinds is presented which provides additional content to the idea of a conceptual scheme. There is sense, and significant content, in the claim that both the world, and our experience of it, are relative to our conceptual scheme